Yemen resembles a rectangle, stretching 1500 kilometres from east to west and 350 kilometres from north to south. It is 528.000 square kilometres. Yemen is slightly smaller than France, Afghanistan and Somalia, and slightly larger than Iraq, Spain or Morocco. Yemen’s northern neighbour Saudi Arabia is four times as big, while its eastern neighbour, Oman, is about half its size.
Yemen’s population is concentrated in the western part of the country, where a ridge of impressive mountains rises from the Red Sea. The width of the mountain ridge variates between 100-200 kilometres, in length stretching across the whole of (western) Yemen, and extending well into the southern Saudi provinces of Jizan and Asir. The mountains are high – that of Jabal Nabi Shuayb, 3666 meters in height, being the highest of the whole Arabian peninsula, with alpine vegetation and a military base on its summit. Most mountains are about 2000 meters in height, making the ridge a large barrier to humid air blowing in from Africa and the Red Sea.
As a result, there is sufficient rain to feed a large population. The fertile mountains around Ibb – towards the south – are green all year round. Rain-fed agriculture abounds in the mountains, which are adorned with laboriously maintained ancient terraces. The largest towns are found along the spine of the mountain ridge, with capital Sana’a in the middle, third largest town Taizz in the south and many medium-sized towns inbetween and in their environs.
The mountains in the north are significantly more arid and consequently much more thinly populated. Northernmost town Sa’adah, once the capital, has roughly a mere 25.000 inhabitants. Beyond the southern end of the mountain ridge lies hot and humid Aden. Its strategic position and natural port have stimulated growth for centuries, making Aden the second town in Yemen.
Lowland Tihama
Another section of the population lives in the coastal plain bordering the Red Sea, called the Tihama, which like the mountain ridge stretches well into Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni Tihama is perpetually hot and in summertime humid as well. It has fertile, semi-tropical spots centred around oases and rivers, mostly in the foothills of the mountains. In some places, the Tihama has an African atmosphere, with dark-skinned people living in straw huts. The plain hosts historic towns such as Al Mokha and Zabid. The port of Al Hudayda is the fourth largest town in Yemen.
To the east, the mountain ridge gradually descends into the arid and sparsely inhabited provinces of Al Jawf, Marib and Shabwa. With the exception of a concentration of agricultural activity and antiquities around Marib, these extensive provinces derive their economical importance mainly from oilfields beneath the semi-desert lands.
Even further to the east, the Hadhramawt suddenly arises, an isolated chain of fertile oases. Yemeni in origin, the Hadhramawt is associated with an ancient, distinct civilization. Exemplary are the towns with their splendid architecture, such as Shibam, home of the world’s first skyscrapers. Shibam has been extensively renovated by unesco. The official governorate of Hadhramawt stretches to Mukalla, a large port town on the Arabian Sea, 500 kilometres from Aden.
With Oman, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, Yemen shares the Ruba’ Al Khali, or Empty Quarter, a vast desert that occupies a large part of the peninsula. It is one of the largest sand deserts in the world, uninhabitable for human beings. Over five thousand years ago, it was home to hunters and gatherers, feeding on wildlife sustained by numerous lakes, which are still detectable in the landscape. Nowadays, the Ruba’ Al Khali has some of the largest oilfields in the world. It presumably holds a wealth of archaeological and geological riches that are yet to be explored. The British explorer Wilfred Thesiger crossed the desert in the first quarter of the twentieth century, resulting in the famous book Arabian Sands.
Yemen has several climates. The west of Yemen benefits from monsoon rains, which fall mainly in late spring and again at the end of summer. Most rain falls in the mountains, with a maximum of an annual 1000 milimetres in the south gradually decreasing to an average of 400 milimetres in the northern mountains. Temperatures in the mountains vary according to altitude and season, with an average of 16 degrees centigrade and frosty winter nights in the higher mountains. The Tihama, by contrast, is always hot and also very humid during the rainy season, a climate similar to that across the Red Sea, in Eritrea and Somalia. The eastern desert has a dry climate, with heavy, but sporadic rains and frosty nights.
There are no railways in Yemen. A number of two-lane roads connect the cities and towns along the spine of the mountain ridge, and to the west and east of them. Many of the thousands of villages can only be reached via unpaved roads, which are often subject to landslides and degradation – thus leaving many people cut off from medical and other basic services. The large island of Soqotra (see box) and several smaller islands, mainly in the Red Sea, also belong to Yemen. Most of them are uninhabited, and serve as military bases. The island group of Hanish has a small resort for tourists interested in deep-sea diving.
Several of Yemen’s areas have on various occasions been designated as nature conservation areas. The island of Soqotra is by far the most important of them, due to its exceptional number of endemic species. The area of Autma is one of the oldest Yemeni nature reserves. The official national park of Jebel Bura preserves Arabia’s last surviving forest, which is still inhabited by baboons. With the exception of isolated Soqotra, conservation of nature reserves is not always adequate, it sometimes lacking popular support, and often lacking finance and subject to corruption.
Box: Frequently nicknamed the Galapagos of the Indian Ocean, the long-neglected island of Soqotra could possibly become one of Yemen’s jewels, and is still in competition to become one of the ‘Seven Wonders of the World’. Soqotra lies at the maritime crossroads of Africa, Asia and Arabia, 800 kilometres south-east from Aden and 250 kilometres from the tip of the Horn of Africa. Throughout history, Asians, Europeans and Africans have visited and influenced Soqotra for both commercial and military reasons, despite isolated conditions as a result of difficult seas and winds. In the 1970s, Soqotra served as a Soviet military base. The island measures about 135 by 40 kilometres. Soqotra and the three surrounding smaller islands are together home to up to 50.000 people. Soqotra is in the process of becoming a destination for environmental tourism and an important site for the conservation of ecodiversity, for much of the isolated island’s rich and remarkable flora and fauna is endemic and unique to the world.
Box: In 2007, plans were revealed to build a bridge between Yemen and Djibouti. The bridge will reconnect the Middle East and Africa, which were once united on the super continent of Gondwana but which drifted apart hundreds of millions of years ago. The bridge will connect two new cities, to be built on either side of the bridge. The bridge will span 3,5 kilometres from Yemen to the island of Perim and from there over 20 kilometres across the Red Sea to Djibouti. The first 5 kilometres will consist of approach bridges, the middle span of 10 kilometres will be supported by just three giant pylons towering more than 400 meters above the 300 meter deep sea. Heading the plan is the Dubai based Middle East Development llc, assisted by engineers of the Danish cowi company, who calculated that construction would take at least twelve years and $20 billion.
Banner: ‘In the name of God. Tree conservation is the responsibility of the government, scientists, preachers and all members of society. For the tree is God’s creation, wherefore he entrusted us with its conservation. It greatly enhances moisture and rainfall, and living conditions.’ (Fatwa, or decree by cadi (scolar) Ahmad Mohamad Zabara, mufti (religious lawmaker) of Yemen)
Banner: ‘Yemen has got a very spectacular topography ranging from majestic mountains to mysterious desert dunes, from fertile flat plains to more than 2000 kilometres of breath-taking beaches along the Arabian Sea coast in the south and the Red Sea coast in the west. (From the Saleh presidential website)
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Yemenis themselves speak of before and after the history of Yemen. With ‘before history’ Yemenis refer to the impressive pre-Islamic civilizations, some of the earliest in history. They represent a rich source for archaeologists, which can compete with civilizations elsewhere in the Middle East. In Yemen itself this era instills an – albeit sometimes uneasy – sense of pride, for these peoples were un-Islamic in habits and customs.
As a consequence, it is mostly foreign academics and researches who conduct research on these ancient civilizations. Morever, the conservation of pre-Islamic sites is not always adequate. For instance, the columns of the temple of Bilqis are subject to graffiti and carving of modern names by young visitors. A further complication regarding archaeological research and conservation is the location of the sites. These are found mainly in tribal territory, which is not always controlled by the government. Before and after excavations researchers usually have to spend long hours negotiating with tribal leaders.
In February 2008, French archeologists discovered evidence for the earliest human presence in the mountain province of Mahwitt in Yemen, not far from the capital city of Sana’a. These finds point to human presence in the Palaeolithic period, the age of the Neanderthalers. Later traces of hunters and gatherers have been found throughout Yemen, predominantly in the desert provinces and in the vicinity of the oases of Hadhramawt. Also found were Stonehenge-like monoliths near the town of Zabid, dating back to the Bronze Age, in the third and second millennia b.c.
The Minaean and Sabaean dynasties kingdoms of Southern Arabia reigned from the tenth century b.c. until the second century a.d. Their power was based on important trade routes between South Arabia and the Middle East. Frankincense and myrrh – necessary for many of the rituals performed by Byzantine and Roman peoples along the Mediterranean – were harvested in the eastern corner of South Arabia, now South Yemen and Oman. Together with other commodities and spices from as far as India and Africa, the goods were transported by Nabatean traders in long caravans from the coast to the centres of civilization in the Levant and Alexandria, from where the goods were sold on by Nabatean sea merchants with much profit.
The trade routes across the Arabian peninsula followed watering places and avoided difficult and unsafe terrain. This led the caravans through the Hadhramawt, past Marib and along the Red Sea coast towards Gaza. The strategic position of Marib on this Frankincense Route resulted in trade, profits and subsequently to the foundation of several South Arabian kingdoms, centred around the kingdom of Saba, also known as Sheba. The Queen of Saba or Sheba – known as Bilqis in Yemen – is mentioned in both the Bible and the Torah, according to which she visited the court of King Salomon at his request. Some archaeologists, however, question whether this is the same queen as Bilqis, insisting that Sheba was a Abyssinian queen. The Koran mentions the dam, and the irrigated lands beyond as ‘two paradises’.
Saba’s lasting fame rests on the elaborate irrigation system the Sabaens laid out in the vicinity of old Marib, of which the ruins can still be found. Archaeologists believe the tradition of irrigating started in the third millennium b.c., well before the era of the Sabaens. Saba’s economic boom was a result of a big dam built around the sixth century b.c., though smaller dams may have been in place earlier. The dam caught the floods caused by the sporadic, but heavy rains in the mountains beyond Marib. The collected water was then distributed through canals, feeding an agricultural complex that supported a civilization that numbered over 300.000 people at its peak. The state of Saba was one of strong institutions, extending its reign for centuries. At times the neighbouring kingdoms of Hadhramawt (to the east), Ma’ín (to the north) and Himyar (to the west) rivalled and even challenged Saba, but the kingdom prevailed until the second century a.d.
Sabaean hegemony started to decline only with the understanding and mastering of the monsoon winds by Indian sailors, which made the long and arduous Frankincense Route redundant. The final collapse of the dam around the sixth century a.d. due to the accretion of sediment and neglected maintenance finally ended the long era of Saba, although there are scientists who claim that it was an earthquake which destroyed the dam. The Koran speaks of the collapse of the dam as a punishment from God – for the Sabaens worshipped multiple gods – and a turning point in history. As the Sabaens often built with perishable materials, the flood washed away many of the traces of Saba. Excavations continue to add to the knowledge of the Sabaen era. Debate continues about the religion of Saba – whether the deity they worshipped, Almaqah, was a moon god or a sun god.
Box: In the 1980s the dam of Marib was re-erected, although this time as a modern dam made of concrete and at a different location, somewhat higher up in the mountains to the east. The funds were provided by Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahayan, former ruler of Abu Dhabi and architect of the United Arab Emirates, who traces his ancestry back to Saba. Like many other Sabaens, his tribe migrated from Saba after the second century b.c., in his case eastwards to the Gulf. The dam has not been used much for its irrigating purposes, as the canals channelling the water to the fertile plains have not yet been built. Presently, it remains a site for tourists and qat-chewing bunches of locals on mellow afternoons.
Before the definite collapse of the dam, Yemeni population was already shifting westwards. Prime reason was the knowledge and mastering of the monsoon winds by Indian sailors. This made the alternative sea route to the Levant possible, wherefore the long and arduous Frankincense Route could be evaded. Second reason was the decline in the use of frankincense as a result of the decrease of Roman ‘pagan’ rituals, in turn caused by the rise of Christianity, which is much more restrained in its use of frankincense. As a consequence, the importance of Marib declined and the Himyarites took over as the supreme kingdom of South Arabia. The Himyarites ruled from Zafar, which is located near the present city of Yarim. The Himyarites were successful in uniting the peoples of desert Yemen and mountain Yemen. Today, Yemeni historians hail this era as the start of modern Yemen.
External influence grew during this era, foremostly that of Christianity and Judaism. The last Himyari king Dhu Nawas converted to Judaism, but was ousted after he massacred the Christians of Najran, now Saudi Arabia, then Yemen. Christian Abyssinians under the command of Abraha, and reportedly with a strong army of men and elephants, invaded the country from Ethiopia and ended the Himyarite kingdom, founding a Christian empire in Yemen. The Koran mentions that Abraha and his army later attacked the Ka’aba in Mecca, in the year of the Elephant, the same year that the prophet Mohammed was born, 571 ad. According to the Koran God defeated Abraha and his army with large swarms of birds.
Meanwhile, in Yemen, the defeated Himyarites sought the help of the Persian emperor, after which a large army of Persian Sassanids drove out the Abyssinians and took power. In the seventh century, the Sassanids definitely converted to Islam, making Yemen an Islamic country, with Sana’a as its capital. Subsequently, Yemen was ruled by several caliphs, appointed and influenced by powerful Islamic rulers from Syria (Umayyads), Iraq (Abbasids) and Egypt (Fatimids). None of the rulers succeeded in extending their rule over the whole of Yemen. Noteworthy is the Fatimid Queen Arwa. Arwa moved the capital south from Sana’a to Jibla, close to Ibb. Queen Arwa lives on in Yemeni legends as Bilqis the Younger.
It was not until the twelfth century that Yemen was again invaded from without. Under the command of Turansah, brother of Salah al-Din, and supported by a strong army of Turks and Kurds, the Ayyubids from Syria pacified Yemen. The Ayyubids ruled and united southern Yemen as far north as Dhamar, but never reached Sana’a. The Ayyubids were succeeded by the Rasulids, who successfully ruled over the south of Yemen for two centuries, and at times even had Sana’a under their control. Monuments from this era can still be found throughout southern Yemen, particularly in Zabid, the historic town on the edge of the Tihama, just before the road climbs up into the mountains towards Taizz. Zabid was the governing capital of Yemen throughout Rasulid times, and has remained an important religious and academic centre ever since.
The Rasulids were succeeded by the Tahirids, originating from Rada, to the east of the mountains. The Tahirids were not as ambitious or successful as the Rasulids, although they did leave Yemen the Ammaryiah-school in Rada, famous for its architecture and recently renovated. In 1517 the Ottoman Turks ended Tahirid rule. The Ottomans ruled for a century, moving the capital from Zabid to Sana’a, and back to Zabid after being defeated in Sana’a by Zaidi tribes from the north. In the nineteenth century the Ottomans briefly returned to Yemen.
In the northern part of Yemen, the Zaidi imams ruled from 873 until 1962. Local tribes invited the first Zaidi imam, in a bid to settle tribal disputes, and the imam stayed. The Zaidi imam heads a Shia sect, followers of the brother of Shias fifth (Zaidis are also called ‘fivers’) imam, whom they judged to be a more just leader then the mainstream Shia imam, whom they deemed corrupt. Zaidis briefly held caliphates in northern Iran, but their stronghold was and is Yemen. From the ninth century onwards, the Zaidi imams have been a constant factor in Yemeni politics, at times extending their rule as far as Taizz.
The Zaidi imams never fully controlled the northern Yemeni tribes, the Zaidi imam being a theocratic ruler more than a military leader. During the eleven centuries of their rule – during which they moved the capital back and forth from Sa’adah to Sana’a and on to Taizz – tribal revolts frequently broke out across the country. In the south and the distant Hadhramawt, smaller dynasties, tribes and sheikhs contested Zaidi rulership. The Ottoman Turks remained present in the coastal areas, where they subsequently tried to control the maritime superpowers of Portugal, Holland and Britain.
In the nineteenth century, the Ottomans returned briefly to power. Again, they never managed to rule the entire country. In the north Zaidi tribes withstood the Ottomans easily, while the southern tip of South Yemen was ruled by the British empire. The British controlled Aden and its immediate surroundings, in order to secure the strategic Strait of Perim – the entrance to the Red Sea – and with it the important sea route to Asia. Aden also possesses a natural port, where long-haul ships could refuel. Beyond Aden, the British rule extended not much further than an alliance with local sheikhs, who kept mostly to themselves.
After its defeat in the First World War, the Ottoman Empire perished, leaving Yemen to the Zaidi imams, with the exception of the British colony of South Yemen. The Zaidi imams ruled the country under the name of the internationally recognized Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen. In 1934, Yemen lost the northern province of Asir to Saudi Arabia. The reign of Imam Ahmad and his son Yahya cut off Yemen from external influence for nearly fifty years, gradually alienating their institutional base of Zaidi Sayyids. By abducting tribal sons as a short-term means of enforcing obedience, Imam Yahya alienated the tribes on whom his military rule was based. There were several revolts, but the imams always prevailed. In 1962, however, a republican revolt – aided by the Egyptian army and aggrieved tribes – drove away the third imam, Badr, to Saudi Arabia. Imam Badr died in 1996 in England, to which he emigrated upon Saudi Arabia’s official recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic (yar) in 1972. He was succeeded as king by his eldest son Ageel bin Muhammad al-Badr.
The struggle for independence in North Yemen lasted for five years. Main actors were the royalists – loyal to the Zaidi imams – and a coalition of aggrieved tribes and townsfolk from Sana’a southwards to Taizz. External influence was strong, with the Egyptian army bombing royalist strongholds, in turn supported by Saudi Arabia. Only when the Egyptians withdrew in 1968 was an agreement reached, making way for the yar, better known as North Yemen. The yar was dominated by the military, which in turn was largely controlled by the tribal confederation of Hashid, based primarily in the central highlands. However, key administrative positions were held by southerners.
Meanwhile in Aden another revolution was taking place. Until then, external influence in tribal territory had been minimal, as first the Ottomans and then the British were only interested in Aden and its vicinity. The British Crown Colony of South Yemen (since 1839) constituted a remarkable combination of urban, cosmopolitan Aden with an enormous tribal hinterland. This period was marked by a worldwide struggle for independence and the appeal of socialism. Arab nationalists had already liberated the northern Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Iraq and North Yemen. Aden unions teamed up with Arab nationalists from the Hadhramawt. Amidst independence movements and revolutions worldwide, the British rule finally collapsed in 1967. The Crown Colony of Aden and its protectorates were replaced by the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
For more than two decades, South Yemen formed an interesting experiment in Arab socialism. Women were granted equal rights, a beer factory was built, qat consumption was limited to weekends and revolutionaries – later to be called terrorists – from all over the world underwent military training in South Yemen. The pdry of the 1970s and 1980s was a haven for international leftist ‘resistance’ fighters, in particular the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (pflp) and the German Rote Armee Fraktion (raf). Traditionalism and modernity often clashed during these years, just as rural tribalism, conservative Islam and hardline socialism proved hard to mix. Moreover, some bloody battles were fought at the top of the ruling National Front. The basis of the pdry eventually proved too small. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1988 their major benefactor disappeared, leaving the pdry on its own.
The PDRY and the YAR fought two small-scale wars, or border skirmishes. Both conflicts ended in unification agreements. Prior to unification the YAR and PDRY merged their oil ministeries, accelarated by the discovery of oilfields near their undefined border. It took until May 1990 before the two Yemens were unified. Sana’a became the political capital, Aden the economic capital. The former rulers shared power in a new government. But they were not ready to share power, southerners being afraid of northern fundamentalists, northerners being afraid of southern socialists.
A real unification never took place. Both governments relocated some of their institutions and army units to each other’s territory. This crippled the economy, which had already been severely hit by the return of up to a million Yemeni expatriates, sent back from Saudi Arabia. Income dwindled, resources ran out, crisis loomed. Fighting broke out in January 1994, when the leader of the pdry announced his secession. The war that followed did not last long. Southern army units were isolated from their power base, or succumbed to northern rule without a fight. After seventy days of fighting Yemen was united again, only this time under northern hegemony. A hegemony that during the years to come is gradually proving to be too dominant.
Modern Yemen is much the work of the longtime president and his entourage. Ali Abdallah Saleh rose to power as an army commander in 1978, and has been president ever since. Saleh has been prevalent in the constant weighing of multiple powers in and outside of Yemen. Saleh has thus held Yemen together in enduring peace, though at the expense of policies guiding Yemen into the modern era. The economic, demographic and environmental conditions in Yemen have far from improved under his guidance.
Box: In 2007 Dutch senator Sam Pormes was forced to give up his seat when it became known that Pormes – a leftwinger – had followed a course on urban guerrilla in South Yemen in 1976, as a member of a group of Dutch ‘Red Youth’. The Youth were instructed by pflp and raf-fighters in ‘a desert village’, where they learned to handle weapons and explosives. According to German testimonies the Dutch behaved as a ‘lazy and undisciplined group of holidaymakers’, although the Dutch themselves were rather impressed by the toughness of the training. One of the Dutch women was later deployed by pflp commander Wadi Haddad in a failed reconnaissance mission to Ben Centurion [Gurion?] airport.
Box: Many profiles on Yemen mention the Roman description of Yemen as ‘Arabia Felix’, or happy Arabia, emphasizing its fertility, in comparison with Arabia Deserta (the vast sandy deserts) and Arabia Petra (the northern rocky part of Arabia). However, according to some historians, this is a misconception, based upon its description as ‘Arabia Eudamion’ or blessed Arabia by Greek geographers. This is a mistranslation of Arabia Al Yaman, or happy Arabia. It should be translated as Arabia ‘at the right hand’, as cartographers of the early Middle East used a tilted map, on which Yemen simply lies on the right.
Box: A common, incorrect theory places the ‘Land of Sheba’ in Yemen, or Southern Arabia. But ‘Saba’ is the name of a female, like ‘Maria’; it is not the name of a land, but of a woman. When the queen visited King Solomon in Jerusalem, he gave her a ring, saying: ‘If thou hast a son, give it to him and send him to me.’ And the queen departed to Ethiopia and she bore a son, and she called him Menelik. (Robertino Solàrion, Apollonius of Tyana & The Shroud of Turin)
Box: The Sana’a Mansucripts. The world’s oldest Koranic manuscripts were discovered in 1965 and rediscovered in 1972, during repairs on the Sana’a Great Mosque, built in the sixth year of the hijra, which signals the start of Islam. The paper manuscripts were found hidden inbetween old and newer layers of ceiling. Extensive restoration work on the ancient, damaged manuscripts is ongoing, but the manuscripts are surrounded by controversy. The non-Muslim ‘orientalist’ scientists previously working on the papers (in case Gerd Puin, a renowned paleographer of the German university of Saarland, who ‘secretly’ photographed the manuscripts) have been accused by some Muslim scholars (for example Aisha Geissinger) of trying to undermine the authenticity of the Koran.
Banner: I asked Anas: “What kind of clothing was most beloved to the Prophet?” He replied: “The Hibra (a kind of Yemenese cloth).” (Qatada, in a hadith)
Banner: Allah’s Apostle was asked about Al-Bit, a liquor prepared from honey which the Yemenites used to drink. Allah’s Apostle said: “All drinks that intoxicate are unlawful (to drink).” (Aisha in a hadith)
Prehistoric
Paleolithic- Traces of human presence found in Al Mahwitt (Central Mountain Yemen)
Stone Age- Traces of hunters and gatherers found in Ruba Al Khali (Eastern Yemen)
Stonehenge-like monoliths found near Zabid (West Yemen-Hadhramawt)
Pre Islamic
2000 bc-500 ad- Unrivalled civilisation in various Kingdoms (Saba, Himyar, Hadhramawt, Ma’ín) across Southern Arabia (South Yemen)
200 ad -621 ad- Various Christian and Judaic kingdoms across South (-West) Yemen
Islamic
Modern age
Festive days
Yemen’s population is very young and thus fast growing. The growth rate (3,2%) is dropping, but is still globally exceeded only by that of four African nations and the peoples of Gaza and the West Bank. In 2007, the average age was fourteen years. More than half the Yemeni population was born during the last fifteen years. Officially, Yemen counted just over twenty-two million inhabitants in 2007. However, this may be a conservative estimate. Projected population numbers hover around an alarming figure of thirty million in 2015 and a peak of fourty million in 2025.
The average Yemeni family has a lot of children. In fact, for decades, Yemeni woman proved to be the most fertile in the world, with an average of over seven births during their sexually productive lifetime. Only since 2005 has this number dropped to below seven. This was achieved after a long and broad national campaign on birth control, supported by tribal elders and influential religious leaders. Today, townspeople give birth to a much lower average of children, approaching modern values committed to the nuclear family. However, birth control is still a much disputed solution in remote mountain villages. Given that many Yemenis live in isolated, rural areas, the population growth rate remains high and will continue to do so for many years to come.
Yemen’s population density is fourty per square kilometre. This is twice the population density in Brazil, half of that in Turkey, roughly the same as in Iran and slightly higher than the US. However, we have to take into account that a large part of Yemen is virtually uninhabitable, made up of desert, arid or steeply mountainous terrain. As a result, Yemen seems a rather populous and busy country. Yemeni men spend most of their lives outdoors, in each others company, instead of within the privacy of their own homes, which further intensifies Yemen’s lively image. Women are also increasingly present in public spaces.
The Yemeni population is to a high degree homogeneous. Nearly all Yemenis are believed to be ethnically of southern Arab origin, descendants of Qahtan, son of S(h)em, son of Noah. Southern Arabs are considered to be ‘purer’ Arabs. Qahtan’s brother Adnan is regarded as the father of the northern Arabs. Northern Arabs are considered to be slightly less pure, of mixed blood with amongst others Egyptians, Nabateans, Arameses, and Byzantines. Many Arabs – as far away as the Berbers of North Africa – regard Yemen as their distant land of origin.
Legend has it that Yemen was founded by the father of the southern Arabs, Qahtan. Qahtan was the father of Yemen and the forefather of Saba, eponym of the kingdom of Saba, or Sheba. Saba had two sons: Himyar and Kahlan. After the fall of the kingdom of Saba, the tribes spread from the Marib plateau to settle in the western mountains. Yemeni tribes are not nomadic, but sedentary communities of people belonging to a tribe and bound to their agricultural territory. Tribalism has dwindled in the southern mountains, where conditions are less harsh in comparison to the northern mountains. As a consequence, in the past, the south was often ruled by outsiders, such as the Ottoman Turks. Opportunities for farming in the north are far less favourable. As a result, northerners have always migrated to the south. These migrants did not forget their ancestry. However, many of their tribal practices were lost in the process.
The qabila, or tribe, is of major importance in Yemen. All Yemenis are tribal, but not every Yemeni perceives himself as predominantly tribal. Southern Yemenis are a lot less tribal then northerners. City inhabitants – or civilians – also call themselves tribal, for the qaba’il – the plural of qabila – are both a source of distant pride and of present-day identity, fostering a sense of righteousness. If necessary, people refer to their tribe in order to get elected, to get protection, to find a job or to get permission to build a house. The tribes therefore dominate Yemeni politics.
In ancient times the Hadhramawt – a chain of oases at a great distance from mountainous Yemen – was a kingdom alongside ancient Saba. But unlike Saba, the Hadhrami culture never perished, as the oases of the Hadhramawt continued to support life. The people of the Hadhramawt have since been largely independent from the rest of Yemen, the Hadhramawt being a mostly self-supporting and self-governing island in the eastern desert of Yemen. Nevertheless, throughout the centuries, many Hadhramis have left the region, as the Hadhramawt offers little room for expansion. Trade has also always been an important factor in the economy of Hadhramawt.
The Hadhrami migration was at its height during the eigtheenth and nineteenth centuries, when many Hadhramis settled in India, Malaysia, Singapore, and especially Indonesia. The Handhrami diaspora has maintained strong ties with its homeland. Some Hadhramis still send their sons and daughters to the Hadhramawt for their education and in order to marry, and continually contribute to the impressive array of knowledge in Hadhrami libraries and knowledge centres.
The Hadhrami diaspora also continued to financially support their homeland, from as far away as the Indonesian archipelago. The Hadhramis have been instrumental in the early spread of Islam, just as the traders of the East and West Indies companies were instrumental in the spread of Christianity. During the past half century, Hadhramis have migrated to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden’s father originates from Wadi Doan, close to the Hadhramawt.
There is virtually no immigration in Yemen. Exceptions are the small expat communities in Sana’a and Aden, and a growing group of Somali refugees who crossed the Red Sea in small boats owned by human traffickers during the last decade, fleeing the dire circumstances in South Somalia. The Somali refugees live in large refugee camps near Aden and Bir’ Ali, which are supported by the UNHCR, and on the outskirts of large cities such as Sana’a and Aden. In 2007, their number exceeded 100.000, the influx still continuing.
Box: “The cost of a boat from Djibouti to Yemen is only $30 per person and the route is safer from Djibouti to the Yemeni coasts. The problem is that to be trafficked from Somalia to Djibouti, a person needs at least $200. The average income of any worker in Somalia is at least $100 per month, which is enough for living, but it is insecure there. That’s why I left Somalia for Yemen. I want to live in peace,” said Ramadhan Abbas Ibrahim (34), refugee from Moqadisu. (Mohammed al-Kibsi in Yemen Observer, 2008)
Another exception is the Akhdam, a group of immigrants of African origin. The Akhdam – the word literally means servants – are believed to be the offspring of Christian Ethiopian warriors who invaded Southern Arabia in the sixth century, but were later defeated and forced to serve the Yemeni Arab population. Other studies indicate that the Akhdam may also include indigenous Yemenis from the Tihama, and more recent immigrants from the African side of the Red Sea.
The Akhdam – who themselves prefer to be called Muhamasheen, or ‘marginalized ones’ – number somewhere between 250.000 and 500.000, though estimates by Akhdam activists are much higher, up to three million. In practice, the Akhdam lack many civil rights, including the right to possession of land or to obtaining building permits or holding passports. The Akhdam are not entitled to social services, and foreign aid generally passes them by. Intermarriage with Yemeni Arabs does not take place and the Akhdam are still doing the most menial of jobs in Yemen.
Akhdam can be seen everywhere in Yemen, dressed in orange overalls, sweeping the streets. As there are hardly any dustbins on the Yemeni streets and Yemenis like to dispose of their refuse there and then, there is always plenty of rubbish to be collected. Every building block in Sana’a has its own Akhdam to collect rubbish and sweep the streets. According to the local director of Sana’a waste collection, the Akhdam are nowadays paid reasonable wages.
Close to a million Yemeni migrant workers – the story has it that every family had at least one male member working in Saudi Arabia during the 1970s and 1980s – were expelled from Saudi Arabia after Yemen declared its neutrality during the First Gulf War in 1991. Many have since returned to Saudi Arabia. The 2004 census showed that 1.2 million Yemenis live in Saudi Arabia, notably in Riyad. Another 500.000 reside elsewhere in the world, with large communities in Manchester, UK, and in Dearborn, Detroit, US.
Saudi Arabia has attempted to build a separation wall along part of its border with Yemen, to stop the smuggle of commodities, arms and people. This nearly led to an armed conflict with Yemen in 2004, and to discord with the tribe that occupies the land on both sides of the wall. It is unclear how much of the ‘wall’ has been completed.
Box: ‘Hundreds’ of (often neglected) children cross the border with Saudi Arabia daily, in search of a better life. After a long journey with an anonymous truck driver, the children reach Haradth, where smugglers take them across the border. “Just before the border,” Ahmed recalled, “the smugglers told us to get out of the truck and walk behind the check point so the police wouldn’t be able to see us,” after which they met up with the children again at the main road and took them to Jeddah. (Alia Ishaq in Yemen Times, 2008)
Banner: The government seeks to offer all facilitations for the expatriates to increase their investment and remittances, to promote tourism and to encourage the brains to comeback to Yemen.
Banner: “Then came president Saleh, whose rule has not been labeled by historians up to now. Writers and researchers are still at a loss at what name to give to his term of rule, but most of them are inclined to call it a period of tribal governance.” (Mazin Al Saqqaf in the Yemen Times, 2008)
Banner: “Concerning democracy and tribe, Al-Ahmar said that the tribe is superior to everything except religion.” (Sheikh Abdullah Ben Hussein Al-Ahmar on the issue of border dispute between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Yemen Times 2000)
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The state religion in Yemen is Islam. Mainstream Islam – Sunnism – has been predominant in the south and east since the advent of Islam in the sixth century. Yemeni Sunnism follows the Shafi religious law school, which is the second largest of the four existing Sunni law schools. Throughout history, there has been little religious conflict between Shafis and Shia Yemenis, neither being extremist religions. In general, Yemenis are rather tolerant.
However, since the 1970s, Saudi influence is growing. Many Yemenis have worked in Saudi Arabia, some of them adopting puritan Wahhabism, or Salafism. Saudi Arabia has financed a large number of Wahhabi schools – formally called scientific centres – in Yemen, where Yemeni youth is educated according to Wahhabi beliefs. Wahhabi Salafism is not very tolerant toward Shia Islam, denouncing it as a religion of Kaffirs or unbelievers.
A growing number of Yemenis follows Wahhabi Islam. The movement is strong and appealing, as it offers its followers access to schooling, medical services, and business opportunities. Throughout Yemen, mosques are converted to Wahhabism by appointing Wahhabi imams. When tribal sheikhs ‘convert’ to Wahhabism, the whole tribe is converted along with them. Exact numbers are unknown, but the Sunni share of population has consequently increased from half to more then three-quarters of the Yemeni population.
The Zaidi sect of Shia Islam has long been dominant in Yemeni politics. Zaidism is a sect or branch of mainstream Shiism, arising from a dispute over leadership concerning the fifth imam. Zaidis are therefore also called ‘fivers’, as opposed to the Shia mainstream ‘twelvers’ (followers of the twelfth and last imam) and the Ismaili sect of ‘seveners’ (arising from a dispute over the succession of the sixth imam). Compared to mainstream twelver Shiism, Zaidi Islam is considered to be rather moderate, its doctrine similar to Shafi Sunnism. In the past, purely theological disputes between Zaidis and Shafis have seldom led to conflict.
Invited as a mediator by quarrelling tribes, the Zaidi imam travelled from north Iran to Yemen in the tenth century. The leading northern tribes have supported Zaidism ever since, adhering to the Zaidi imam as religious and political leader, while retaining tribal – or territorial – autonomy. This led to a theocracy – akin to a caliphate or a kingdom – that was kept in place until 1962. At times, the rule of the imam extended well into the Sunni south, tribes sometimes switching their affiliation from Shafi Sunnism to Zaidi Shiism and back to Sunnism. The seat of the imamate switched between Sa’adah and Sana’a, and even to southern Taizz.
The revolution of 1962 ended the Zaidi imamate. Since then, Zaidi influence has gradually decreased, many tribes switching back to Shafi Sunnism, or to the Salafi movement of Wahhabism. The complex arena of Yemeni tribal politics is characterized by constantly shifting positions and alliances. Again, exact numbers are unknown, but within three decades the Zaidi share of the population has dwindled from 50% to 25% or less. In the far north, loyal Zaidi tribes (also called royalists, as they followed the ‘regnal’ Zaidi imams) began to oppose the more penetrating doctrine of Wahhabism, as mosques, religious communal lands and funds (waqf) were shifted to Salafism at the end of the twentieth century. The present government supports this shift to Salafism, seemingly because it helps to weaken the influence of the royalists, their former foes in the revolutionary war. The Zaidi uprising has culminated in a full-scale guerrilla war which is being waged around Sa’adah since 2004. It is slowly expanding southwards. In May 2008, the war even reached the environs of Sana’a.
Judaism came to Yemen with Jews migrating from the vicinity of Jerusalem after the destruction of the temple by the Romans, in the first century a.d. In fact, in pre-Islamic times, Judaism – on and off with Christianity – dominated significant parts of Yemen, local rulers converting to Judaism and Christianity. The most famous Jewish ruler was Yusuf Dhu Nuwas, a Himyari king who ruled from Zafar in the sixth century. Dhu Nuwas reportedly persecuted Christians, in reaction to the persecution of Jews by the Byzantine emperor in the north of the Middle East. Dhu Nuwas’s rule was eventually ended by a large Christian Ethiopian force.
Judaism and Jews stayed in Yemen. After Islam took over, Jews were granted the status of dhimmis; protected by Muslim rulers, but without full civil rights. Jews were not allowed to ride horses, wear colourful clothes or to build houses that were taller than Muslim buildings. As a result, they built cellars, in which they could also store wine, that they were allowed to drink. Orphaned Jews were often converted to Islam. In the nineteenth century, Jews were given the degrading task of cleaning public baths, toilets and sewers.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were some 80.000 Jews in Yemen, spread over 1.050 communities, predominantly in Zaidi areas. As many professions were forbidden, Jews in Yemen made a living as artisans and craftsmen: jewellers, weavers, silversmiths, shoemakers. This resulted in the paradoxical situation that first-class Muslim citizens were highly dependent on second-class Jewish citizens.
By the end of the nineteenth century, migration – or aliyah – to Palestine began. At first only a few families went, but when the state of Israel was founded, the interest of Yemeni Jews grew. In 1950, with the consent of the Yemeni imam, the government of Israel mounted Operation Flying Carpet, airlifting between 35.000 and 50.000 Jews from Aden to Israel. Many Yemeni Jews perceived this as the fulfilment of God’s promise to end the suffering and diaspora.
Their reception in modern en secular Israel was somewhat of a disappointment. There was little demand for the knowledge and skills of these Jews, who often did not speak the Hebrew language. Yemeni Jewry consequently fell into the lower social classes in Israel, together with black Ethiopian Jewry. The Yemeni Jewish migration has continued throughout the years.
Box: Up to a few hundred – some say two thousand – Jews remain in present-day Yemen, mostly in the town of Rada’a and north towards Sa’adah. They still work as artisans and craftsmen. In Rada’a, for instance, Jews dominate the door welding industry. In Sana’a, the former Jewish neighbourhood of Al-Qa is now entirely inhabited by Yemeni Muslims, apart from one old Jewish lady. Remnants of Jewish presence are scant. In 2007 and 2008, Yemeni Jews were reportedly threatened by Zaidi militants in Sa’adah. However, analysts view this as an attempt by the government to rally western support for the subsequent attacks on Zaidi rebels.
The Ismaili branch of Shia Islam arrived in Yemen with the Fatimid Empire, that ruled from Egypt from the eigth till the tenth century. Ismailis (sometimes referred to as ‘seveners’) originally differed from mainstream Shiism on the topic of succession of the sixth imam. However, they have since drifted towards a more liberal religion, branching off into a number of different sects. Ismailiyya has tended to spread eastwards, to India and parts of Iran, but enclaves can be found in countries such as Turkey, Syria and Yemen. Only one or two percent of Yemenis call themselves Ismailiyya. The Yemenis also call them Al Bokhra. Al Bokhra are renowned merchants, with their own market in the vicinity of Bab al Yemen, the main entrance of the old city.
Box: Ismaili villages are mainly found in the high Haraaz mountains, an hour’s drive west of Sana’a. The village of Al Hoteib – just 5 kilometres from Haraaz’s capital Manakha – is a famous pilgrim site, visited mainly by Indian pilgrims belonging to the large Indian branch of the Ismaili sect of the Sulaymanis. In Al Hoteib, they visit the tomb of Hattem bin Ibrahim bin al-Hussein al-Hamdani, a sixteenth century Ismaili scholar. The scenic surroundings are covered with coffee shrubs. Harazi coffee is a famous coffee brand in Yemen, Ismaili coffee being the top brand.
Banner: ‘It is at any rate certain that in the sixth and early seventh centuries Jews swarmed into the Hejaz and Yemen and that, moreover, a great movement of proselytism had taken place and was still in progress.’ (Robertino Solàrion, The Apollonius Of Tyana & The Shroud Of Turin)
Banner: ‘Government actions to counter an increase in political violence in Sa’ada restricted some practice of religion. In January 2007, for the third year, the government banned the celebration of Ghadeer Day (a holiday celebrated by Shia Muslims) in parts of the Sa’ada governorate.’ (Yemen Times on the freedom of religion report)
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In tribal societies, decisions are taken in the interest of the family. This is true in all societies, but in tribal societies the family extends well beyond the immediate core family. It encompasses a large group of people sharing a common ancestor, subdivided in tribes and clans with ancestral offspring. Identity is not only individual, it has a strong tribal aspect, resulting in a common identity. An insult directed at, or a pledge made by a member of the tribe can be taken personally by a distant member of the same tribe. Marriage occurs within the tribe, so that possession (of land) remains within the tribe. The tribal sheikh – whether chosen or hereditary – represents the tribe in inter-tribal matters. The sheikhs are supposed to be consulted by rulers of the state in matters concerning the tribe’s territory.
All Yemenis are tribal, although not every Yemeni perceives himself foremost as tribal. Southern Yemenis are a lot less tribal then northerners. City people – or civilians – do not usually call themselves tribal. Indeed, the qaba’il – the plural of qabila – are both a source of distant pride, for their members are considered proud yet stubborn, uneducated, uncivilized farmers from isolated mountain villages. If necessary, however, people refer to their tribe in order to get elected, to get protection, to find a job or to get permission to build a house. The tribes therefore dominate Yemeni politics.
The northern mountains and the eastern plateau have remained largely independent of outside influence. Throughout the centuries, the tribes ruled themselves, in constantly varying alliances. At times, they extended their rule southwards. Dominant throughout Yemen’s history are the tribes of Hamdan, who trace back to Kahlan, son of the progenitor of the (southern) Arab race. Their territories lie in the heartland north and east of Sana’a. The Hamdani tribes are divided into two confederations: the Hashid and Bakil. The current president Saleh is a member of the tribe of Sanhan, belonging to the Hashid. As a result, the tribes of Hashid dominate the government. However, paradoxically, the government does not control the autonomous tribes.
Shura, or consultation, is an important organ in tribal matters. It is an institute that became incorporated in the political Islam after Islamization. It is the Islamic equivalent of consultative democracy. Rulers of states are supposed to consult those with knowledge and authority in important decisions. Rulers of Yemen have practised shura throughout history, thus preventing Yemen from becoming a ‘second’ Afghanistan or Somalia. When at times rulers, such as the last imam, did not practice shura, their rule was short-lived.
The present, formal Majlis-al-Shura (gathering of consultation) came into being with the constitutional change in 2001. The Majlis-al-Shura consists of 111 members, who have all been appointed by the president. As tradition dictates, there are seats for tribal sheikhs, for the judiciary (cadis) and for sayyids, learned men, often descendants of the prophet Mohammad’s family. Constitutionally, the Majlis-al-Shura has an advisory role. Drafts and proposals are passed through the Shura before Parliament takes a vote. The Shura can also have a decisive voice in certain important legislative matters. As its members are appointed, its role and function are not always transparent.
Yemen may be the poorest and least developed country of the Middle East, it boasts the longest tradition of ‘western style’ democracy in the region. The Yemen Arab Republic (yar) already held elections before unification. Since unification, elections have been ‘reasonably’ free and fair. Parliamentary elections were held in 1993, 1997 and 2003, with an increasing turnout of 76% (or six million people) in 2003. President Saleh’s General People’s Congress (gpc) has dominated the 301 seat Parliament since its founding, taking the majority of the votes, with an ever increasing percentage of the vote. However, this majority is obscured by the large number of independent candidates.
Since 1978, president Ali Abdallah Saleh has headed various governments through his General People’s Congress. The gpc has dominated Yemeni politics since its founding in 1990, making Yemen virtually a one-party state. After unification in 1990, Saleh shared some power with South Yemen’s (pdry) dominant socialist party ysp, until a brief, unsuccessful secession war broke out in the South in 1994. After the 1997 elections, Saleh’s party gpc formed a broad coalition with the conservatives of Islah. Since the last elections in 2003, Saleh’s gpc heads the government alone, though still appointing opposition candidates of ysp and Islah to some ministerial posts or as chairmen of the Houses.
Yemen’s most recent cabinet (2005) has a rather technocratic character, with young, foreign educated technocrats holding key posts. This is seen as a measure to emphasize Yemen’s ambition to become a modern state with solid institutions, a transparent bureaucratic infrastructure and a stable state budget, favouring much-needed foreign investment. The current cabinet counts two female ministers, twice as much as in the previous cabinet.
Ali Abdallah Saleh has been governing Yemen since he became president in 1978. Saleh was twice re-elected, in 1999 and in 2006, both times with an absolute majority (97% and 78%). In the last election his contender received nearly a quarter of the vote, the main opposition party Islah joining the united opposition in supporting an alternative candidate.
Saleh’s position in Yemen is undisputed. Saleh enjoys wide popular support throughout the country, although he is less popular with southerners than with his fellow central and northern countrymen. Saleh has positioned himself as a mediator, or deal maker, between Yemen’s various factions. As a tribesman, Saleh receives support from the central and northern tribes. As a townsman, he receives support from the bourgeoisie. His strongest base is the army, from which he rose as an army commander to become president about thirty years ago.
Saleh’s main challenge is transparency. Saleh consults everybody, as Yemen’s rulers traditionally do. Saleh thus practices traditional shura. But it is not always clear who his negotiating partners are, or which body holds the most power: the elected Parliament, the formally appointed Majlis-al-Shura, the powerful army or tribal shura’s behind the scenes. Furthermore, Saleh has surrounded himself with family members holding key posts, or worse, decisive positions behind the scenes. His half brother Ali Mohsen, for instance, is a very powerful army commander, and, according to some Yemenis, the real president.
The lack of transparency around Saleh does not contribute to his legitimacy. Corruption is widespread in Yemen. In 2007, Transparency International rated Yemen 137th on the global list, with a score of only 2.5 (out of 10). This is a decline of 0.2 points from 2004. As a comparison, the list is headed by Finland, Denmark and New Zealand with a score of 9.4. Qatar is the highest scoring Arab state with a score of 6, giving them a 37th place. Yemen’s neighbour Oman scores 4.7 (53rd), Saudi Arabia 3.4 (73rd).
GPC- Yemeni politics are dominated by the General People’s Congress (gpc). The gpc has won all of the elections and has formed all governments since the unification. A large number of factions are represented in the gpc, civilians as well as tribals. The gpc lacks an ideology or clear-cut political program, almost in itself resembling a shura. After the last three elections, many independents joined the gpc upon election. Members of the opposition also sometimes join the gpc, as it is the only way to exert influence in Yemeni politics.
Islah- Literally: reform party. The basis of Islah is tribal, but the doctrine is conservative Islam. Islah can be described as a Muslim brotherhood in Yemen, as it advocates Islamic principles and opposes the widespread corruption in the government. Islah holds a special position in the political landscape, owing to its leader Sheikh Abdallah Al Ahmar, who died in 2007. Al Ahmar was the longtime sheikh, or leader, of the Hashid, the most powerful tribal federation. Under Al Ahmar’s leadership, Islah first allied with the GPC of president Saleh. Islah and Al Ahmar also supported Saleh in all but the last presidential elections. In 2005, Islah allied with a remarkable group of opposition parties, called the Joint Meeting Parties.
There is another face to Islah, that of Abdulmajid Al Zindani. Zindani represents puritan Wahhabi (or Salafi) Islam, originating from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have financed the establishment of so- called ‘scientific institutions’ throughout Yemen, where young people are educated according to Wahhabi beliefs. Some reports speak of students who attend class being offered financial remittance, making Wahhabism a more popular form of Islam then traditional Zaidi Shiism. Al Zindani is a controversial figure, and has been tied to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in western media reports.
YSP-The Yemen Socialist Party, remnant of the former socialist state of South Yemen pdry. The ysp enjoyed strong southern support just after unification, but lost its popularity due to internal strife and the secession war of 1994. The party has remained popular in Aden, but does not enjoy much support elsewhere.
Box: Sheikh Abdallah Al Ahmar was for many decades leader of the tribal confederation of Hashid, one of the dominant factors in tribal politics. His style was one of shrewdness, moderation and mediation. Al Ahmar was a longtime speaker in Parliament and a man of authority and wealth, owning many businesses. It remains to be seen which of his sons will inherit the position and authority of their father. His son Sadiq Al Ahmar – one of the more tribal and conservative of his sons – has taken over his position as tribal sheikh. Sadiq has been trying to end the northern war with the Houthis, accusing the army of furnishing weapons to different tribes, so as to feed the ongoing tribal disputes in the North. His brother Hamid – a foreign educated businessman, and, just like his father, a wealthy man – is more likely to inherit his father’s political position. Hamid is a modern politician who was behind the success of the Joint Meeting Parties.
Box: The Joint Meeting Parties is a modern, unorthodox umbrella organisation of opposition parties. Its main contributors are Islah and ysp, two former enemies united in their opposition to the regime of gpc and president Saleh. Other parties include left-wing groups, Baathists, Nasserists and two Zaidi opposition parties, the conservative Al Haq and the modern upf. The jmp raised a surprising amount of support in the presidential elections of 2007, in which their independent candidate Faysal Bin Shamlan received almost 25% of the vote. The jmp is seen by analysts as the possible birth of civil society in Yemen.
Most tribesmen carry arms, as a sign of independence and resilience; a pistol in the back pocket, a kalashnikov hanging over the shoulder, and the janbiyyah – the curved dagger – hanging from the colourful, wide belt. In the past decades, the Al Salaam Organisation for Disarmement has proved successful in eradicating the carrying of arms in the main cities. Guns and pistols have more or less disappeared, the janbiyyah being promoted to traditional dress.
However, the reach of Yemeni government does not usually extend into its border regions. In many areas the tribes are still autonomous. In tribal country one can easily come across patrolling pickup trucks transformed into heavily armed vehicles. Tribes traditionally ‘cut’ or block roads in order to receive government funding, or take people hostage so as to pressure the government into funding roads, schools and medical facilities in remote areas. Several tourists have been taken hostage during the last two decades. A large part of Yemen is off-limits to tourists. In areas to the east of Yemen – where one finds the major oil fields – the army regularly fights tribal groups demanding a larger share of the oil revenues.
Yemen’s human rights record is poor. There has been some improvement in women and child rights, in law and in practice. But as a consequence of the war on terror and the guerilla war in the north, the overall situation is deteriorating. Prisoners of war remain in detention or are sentenced to death, often without trial. The press is increasingly curtailed. Newspapers have been shut down, journalists have been jailed, internet sites have been blocked.
As most affiliations are tribal or religious, civil society is weak in Yemen. Most civil organisations are not very well organized, remaining dependent on individuals with language skills and knowledge of and connections with western benefactors. As the country opens up, however, civil organisations are growing in number and in size. There are several successful women organisations in the country, helping women to become financially independent. Some analysts regard the political umbrella of the Joint Meeting Parties as a step towards civil society.
In the vicinity of Sa’adah, the army has been fighting a full-scale guerrilla war since 2004. The opposing party are the so-called Houthis, a Zaidi opposition group, followers of Hussein Badr ad-Deen al-Houthi, who died during the first outburst of violence in 2004. The exact number of casualties hitherto is unknown, although thousands have died on both sides. The number of displaced persons is around 100.000, for many houses have been destroyed in the fighting.
The conflict centres around the government penetration of the Sa’adah region, a traditional stronghold of the Zaidis and longtime capital of the imamate. The Houthi movement of believing youth started to rally wide support in the 1990s, as a reaction to the marginalization of the Zaidi religion. Due to the increasing influence of Saudi Wahhabism – many people ‘converting’ to more lucrative Wahhabism – the share of Zaidis in the Yemeni population has decreased from 50% to around 20% in the past three decades. The government repeatedly appointed Wahhabi imams in mosques in Sa’adah, taking away waqf – communal property and tax collection – from the Zaidis. Many Zaidi supporters in Sana’a were taken into custody after fighting erupted in 2004.
The Houthi family is of royal descent. The Yemeni government makes out that the Houthis are a conservative fundamentalist movement that wants to reinstall the old royal imamate. Prior to the outbursts of fighting, the Houthis were made out to be anti-American fundamentalists and were blamed for attacks on the Jewish community in the North. This seems to be an attempt to rally global support for the attacks on the Houthis. However, this image is most probably incorrect, for although the Zaidi sect may be conservative, it is traditionally reasonably moderate and tolerant. The only remaining Yemeni Jews are found in the Zaidi North, where they continued to live alongside the Zaidi tribes after Operation Magic Carpet flew tens of thousands of Yemeni Jews to Israel in the 1950s.
According to the government in Sa’adah, the Houthis are (financially) backed by Iran and Libya. Leading members of the Houthi family have been banned from Yemen, but continue to represent the movement in exile. Yahya Al Houthi – a member of parliament stripped of his parliamentary immunity – now lives in Germany. Early 2007, mediation efforts by the Qatari government stopped the fighting periodically.
In 2007 and 2008, fighting erupted once more, mutual trust being low and both sides apparently have difficulty living up to the Qatari peace agreement. The government reportedly armed opposing Sunni tribes to engage in the fighting. In May 2008, in what is called the ‘fifth war’ in the North, journalists reported the engagement of American commandos and the Republican brigade, commanded by the president’s son, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Yemen is of minor geopolitical importance to the outside world. The port of Aden has yielded strategic interest from marine powers throughout history. The rest of the country has remained isolated from the outside world, until the imamate ceased to exist in 1962. Yemen has since been a strong advocate of the Arab cause. In the 1991 Gulf War, Yemen took a neutral stand, emphasizing an Arab solution to the conflict. This was interpreted as support for Saddam Hussein by the members of the so-called ‘coalition’, of which Saudi Arabia was a leading member. As a result, up to a million Yemeni expatriates working in Saudi Arabia were sent back home, plummeting Yemen into economic disarray.
Recently, Yemen has been strengthening its bonds with Arab states. There have been a number of agreements with Saudi Arabia regarding their undemarcated border. Yemen is due to become a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) in 2016. The country’s economic importance to other Gulf states is minimal, but its political significance is growing, thanks to its large population. Many Arabs trace their history back to Yemen. Its cultural heritage is therefore of major importance.
Since the attacks on the Twin Towers in September 2001, Yemen has sided with the US in the battle against al-Qaeda. Yemen has thus avoided being included in the US ‘axis of evil’, but national support for this stand is very low. Eritrea engaged Yemen in a short armed conflict over the small but strategic Hunaish island in the Red Sea. International mediation concluded in Yemen’s favour.
Yemen has always had friendly ties with the rest of the world. This has resulted in a significant share of foreign aid to Yemen (8.2% of gdp in 1990, decreasing to 2.2% in 2006). Japanese, Chinese and Russians have built roads across the country. European benefactors have contributed much to hospitals and social services, and to the restoration of monumental Yemen.
To its own annoyance, in media publications Yemen is often described as Osama bin Laden’s ancestral homeland. The bin Ladens migrated to Saudi Arabia (from Wadi Do’an, a valley in the Hadhramawt) in the early nineteenth century. Popular support for al-Qaeda matches that in other Arab states, but as a consequence of the short reach of the state, active al-Qaeda supporters – many of them veterans of the Afghan war – have been roaming the country, at times gaining tribal protection. In 1998, a supposed al-Qaeda cell killed four of their sixteen tourist hostages after being attacked by the army. Al-Qaeda cells bombed the US warship USS Cole in 2000 and the French Tanker Limburg in 2002. Several oil pipelines have been bombed in the eastern lowlands. In 2007, seven Spanish tourists were killed by al-Qaeda gunmen near Marib, and again in 2008, in Marib, two Belgian tourists were killed, together with their Yemeni drivers. In 2008, American buildings in Sana’a were shelled. Yemen and the US are officially co-operating in the battle against al-Qaeda. American secret service agents are believed to be operating in Yemen. The US accused the Yemeni government of being too soft on al-Qaeda after the USS Cole bomber made a spectacular escape from prison for the second time. The US wanted him extradited, but Yemen refused, insisting on the liberation of Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo Bay first.
Banner: ‘Yemen’s economy and society are in danger of collapsing in as few as several years.’ (Robert Burrowes, political analyst and Yemen specialist, Yemen Times 2008)
Banner: ‘They have predicted Yemen’s collapse so many times before, and we are still here. So we take such words with a smile.’ (Mohammad Al Aidarous, Yemeni waterspecialist BRON?)
Banner: ‘Even Osama bin Laden disapproves of terrorist activities in Yemen. According to political and media analyst Nabil Al-Soufi, bin Laden wants Yemen to be a “breeding and training haven and not an area of combat.”’ (Editorial Yemen Times 2008)
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According to international figures, throughout modern times, Yemen was the poorest Arab state, the poorest state of the Middle East, and one of the poorest states of Asia. Perhaps it is better to compare Yemen with African standards of living. In 2007, Yemen ranked 153 on the UN poverty index of 177 states, surpassing only twenty four African countries. The average annual income officially stands at $760. Close to half the population (45%) lives on less then $2 a day, a third only has $1 or less to spend a day.
The disparities in Yemen are great. Judging by the figures, the rural population is poor, but is largely self-sufficient, with home produce to fall back on. The situation is worse for the urban poor, for whom there is no escape from hunger. Beggars are common in the streets of Yemeni cities. Hungry people wait for leftovers outside roadside restaurants. The situation has barely improved during the past two decades, any improvement being outweighed by the strong population growth.
That said, there are also many wealthy inhabitants and a growing middle class. A significant portion of the oil money, qat profits and remittances from expatriate workers goes unrecorded, but feeds the informal economy all the same. As a result, the informal economy dominates Yemen.
Though most Yemenis are of tribal origin, it is possible to make some distinctions as regards social classes. There is a small upper class of Zaidi Ashraf sayyids. These are all Hashemites, descendants of the Prophet’s family (Sharif, Ashraf). They are considered wise and learned men, and are traditionally consulted in important matters. The power and influence of this group is somewhat diminishing as a consequence of the Zaidi guerrilla in the North. There is another small upper class of cadis, or religious judges.
Most Yemenis – the people or al sha’ab – are tribal. Traditional tribals may commute to towns and cities during business hours or for longer periods, but remain attached and faithful to their territorial power base in tribal areas. Urban tribals are slowly transforming into a large middle class with tribal roots. Urban tribals are dominant towards the south, where some families have turned into oligarchies rather than tribal groups.
At the bottom of the social pyramid there are two groups, the Akhdam and the Mazayy’na. The Akhdam – of African roots and appearance – form an underclass, spending their days sweeping the streets and cleaning cities throughout Yemen. Estimates on the number of Akhdam variate between half a million and three million. The Mazayy’na is a lesser known, small group of tribal Yemenis, who perform service duties for their fellow tribal villagemen. They earn a living as hairdressers, butchers and as servicemen in the hammams. Both groups can be categorized as castes; escape from their social position – through intermarriage with other groups or otherwise – is impossible.
Until the revolution of 1962, education was the privilege of an elite offspring of sayyids and cadis. Only a few schools existed. Since the revolution, schools have been built across the country, educating new generations. Today, just over half of all Yemeni adults are literate, with women catching up rapidly through adult illiteracy eradication centres in all cities and major towns. Yemini urban population enjoys an average of six years of schooling, rural Yeminis an average of 2.2 years. Broken down according to gender, these figures are 5.35 years for men and 1.45 years for women (figures 1999).
However, Yemen’s education system is improving through the building of schools across the country. Schools in Yemen are found on hilltops inbetween villages and are used intensively. Morning sessions are usually for primary pupils, afternoons for the older children. Fees are limited to a few hundred riyals (a few dollars) per year, plus the cost of a school uniform. Over three quarters of all smaller children now enter primary school (figures 2005). Most of the boys finish primary school. For girls this is different, only half of the 64% girls (up from 45% in 2001) who enrol actually finish school, the rest dropping out at the first sign of womanhood.
Only 21% of all girls and 45% of all boys continue on to secondary education. These figures drop to 5% and 18% for tertiary education. It is unclear whether children belonging to the Akhdam underclass are educated, and if so, how many. It is an unwritten rule that the Akhdam do not qualify for social services, few Yemenis wanting, or allowing their children, to mix with them.
Yemen’s official labour force is small. As there is no central system for recording and analyzing data, figures regarding the Yemeni economy are very unreliable. Unemployment estimates variate between 7% and 45%. In 2005, a consultant of the Ministry of Works estimated the number of workers at roughly five million, of whom one million are unemployed. These figures sound fairly feasible.
Given that half the population is aged under fifteen, theoretically close to 700.000 young people join the labour market annually. However, most Yemenis still work on their own land (52%, figure 2006) or are partially (self-)employed in the informal sector. Of all Yemeni women, 60% work unpaid, mostly on their own lands.
Yemeni law places women on an equal stand in society. But traditions often impede the execution of these laws. For instance, women enjoy freedom of travel according to the law. But unmarried women are often stopped and turned back at airports if they are not accompanied by a male relative. Married women need their husband’s consent to travel abroad. Women’s wages are only 30% of that of men.
That said, women hold much promise for Yemen. Girls often do better at school, as a professional career is the best way to achieve independence. Also, as girls are not supposed to hang around, they have ample time to study. Most office work is performed by women, although their superior is usually still a man. The acceptance of women in managerial and political positions is small. Early 2008, an opinion poll indicated that 53% of the respondents (of whom three quarters were educated young males) opposed the election of a female mayor in Sana’a.
In 2006, the ruling General People’s Congress made it one of their goals to integrate more women into the economy, setting a target of 15% of all government positions. However, a time frame for this target was not formulated. Women represent 22% of the total labour force. For the informal economy this figure is 38%, while the female segment of the formal public sector is only 9%.
Banner: “I will keep on emphasizing we have this 15% target. My male colleagues have to employ more women at their ministries. It is a slow process. I sometimes find it too slow. But you have to realise that women have only been getting educated the past forty years.” (Amat Al-Razzaq Hommad, Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, on the issue of women development)
As women – involuntarily or not – lead a life separate from the male population, solidarity is strong. There are two official women movements, the National Women Committee and the Yemen Women Union, both financially supported by (and integrated in) the government. In some Yemeni towns women organize themselves in more grassroots women centres, where they are educated or learn a craft or trade. This offers them an opportunity to earn their own income, and achieve more independence in the household.
Yemeni girls generally do not get much room for self-development. The percentage of ‘idle girls’ (fourteen years old, neither in school or at work) in Yemen is the highest in the world: 44% (boys 18%), with an urban-rural split of 18% and 52% (figures World Development Report (wdr) 2007). In most families, girls are taken from school at a young age, preparing for maternity. In the last decades, the average marriage age for girls has risen from ten to fifteen years (for men from 21 to 21.5), though child marriage in Yemen still reaches 52% for girls (7% for boys, figures WDR 2006).
One in seven girls gets married before reaching the age of fourteen. In 2008, an amendment proposed by the National Women Committee to raise the minimum marriage age to eigtheen years was rejected by Parliament. Geographical variations are great. In Mukalla (south coast), the average marriage age is ten, while in Hodaydah and Hadhramawt it is eight (figures 2006). In the larger cities, however, modernization is taking big steps. Girls are now entering the public space – the streets – in fast growing numbers, although they remain veiled and are a minority.
Box: “I will not divorce her, and it is my right to keep her. No need to sleep with her, at least I can have her as a wife. No power can stop me,” the husband, Faez Ali Thamer, said in the Yemen Times of 13 April 2008, about the case filed against him by his eight-year-old wife, Nujood Ali, after being physically and sexually abused for two months by her new husband. The court ordered separation two days later. “There are hundreds of Nujoods who have been subjected to sexual abuse by mature men. The problem is that there is no law to punish the father who marries off the child, the sheikh who allows the marriage, or the husband who takes the child home to serve him as a wife,” said Shatha Mohammed Nasser, the girl’s lawyer.
Healthcare in Yemen was virtually non-existent until the 1960s. Many hospitals and medical outposts have been built, and thousands of doctors and health workers have been educated since. However, many rural Yemenis live in isolated villages, hours away from medical assistance. The knowledge on health issues in the rural areas is still very limited. As a consequence, there are regular outbreaks of diseases such as tuberculosis and cholera, and periodic outbreaks of polio, rift fever and bird flue. More than half the population – living in the lower mountains and along the coast – is prone to malaria, resulting in 30.000 deaths a year. There are just over 2.000 reported cases of HIV/Aids (figures 2007), although the regional office of the World Health Organisation estimates the real figure to be tenfold.
Yemeni women have for decades been the most fertile of the world, producing more then eight children on average. This figure has dropped to just over six, due to continuing efforts by a broad coalition of political, religious and tribal leaders to emphasize the advantages of the nuclear family. The use of contraceptives has risen from 10% to 25% in the last decade. Maternal death has dropped from 1.4% to 0.3%, as skilled health staff is now present at one in four births, which is nearly double the figure of 1990, thanks to the tuition of thousands of midwives. Child mortality (under five years) has dropped from 142 (per 1000) in 1990 to 111 in 2004, of whom 85 were infants.
Banner: A small pack of condoms costs six riyals ($0,25), as stated on a large plaquette at the entrance of the Dhamar health clinic. Most popular, says director Nabila Al Fakih, is the iud, or intra uterine device ($2,50), followed by the birth control pill. The use of contraceptives is increasing, encouraged by religious leaders and as a result of a hard battled change in family law. Husbands are no longer required to give legal consent.
Due to malnutrition, close to half of all Yemeni children is underweight and a third ‘severely stunted’, or too short for their age. The widespread and increasing use of qat does not contribute to good health, as it stills the hunger feeling, wherefore people refrain from eating and sleeping properly. Furthermore, increasing use of fertilizers and pesticides in qat cultivation has led to numerous health problems. Life expectancy for Yemeni women and men is 59 and 62 respectively, of which 48 and 51 are spent in good health, leaving eleven years of poor health for both.
Box: Studies show that the incidence of heart attacks among qat chewers is 49% higher than among non-chewers. Regular users suffer from bad gum disease, a tendency to lose teeth, and a higher incidence of esophageal and gastric cancers. The plant has also been related to a reduction in sperm quality and impotency. Death from qat chewing is usually as a result of the use of highly toxic chemical substances in cultivation. It is mostly in connection with the Topaz chemical product, which is used by farmers to prompt the growth of qat plants. Yemeni markets are crammed with tens of internationally prohibited as well as expired chemical products mostly used by qat farmers. (Yemen Times, December 2005)
For many years, Yemen was believed to be one of the most heavily armed countries in the world, as a result of the love of small firearms among its tribal population. Tribals with a kalashnikov slung over their shoulder, a pistol in the backpocket and the jambiyya dagger at their waist have illustrated many news and country reports. Small firearms remain popular in rural areas, but a recent arms ban has ended this practice in urban areas. It is now believed there are between six and nine million small firearms present in the country, previous estimates numbering fifty million. This would mean forty guns per hundred people, which is half the figure for the US.
The urban ban on arms has contributed much to the decline in crime, which has reportedly dropped by 35%. There is a slow increase of non-armed crime, but it remains a minor problem compared to other countries, with an official crime rate of 1.2, where the average is 33 (per 1000 people). Theft and robbery are virtually non-existent, cities are very safe night and day. Laws on crime and sentencing – sharia based – are rather harsh, with occasional public hangings of murderers, public flogging and the amputation of hands of thieves and robbers and public stoning of adulterers. The numbers of prisoners vary between 3000 and 14.000. As a result of the northern guerrilla and southern unrest, a growing number of (political) prisoners are purportedly being held without charges and trial.
Yemen has often made world headlines with exotic news on the kidnapping of tourists by tribals. In the period 1996-2001, there were 47 kidnappings (of foreigners), involving 114 tourists and 43 expatriates. However, Yemeni kidnappings can be distinguished from ‘ordinary’ criminal kidnappings. The prime reason for the abductions is to pressure the government (and foreign oil companies) to build roads, schools and medical facilities in neglected tribal areas. This is a continuation of old practices, when rulers held tribal sons to force tribal leaders into obedience. The kidnapped tourists and expatriates are usually treated as guests and are released unharmed. After two lethal kidnappings in 1999 (not by tribals but by al-Qaeda affiliates), the government became less ‘lenient’ towards the tradition of abductions.
Banner: ‘The state, which on previous occasions has dealt with the tribe by bargaining and granting kidnappers government posts and privileges, enhanced and encouraged this phenomenon, allowing it to establish itself firmly.’ Kidnapping researcher Abdulbari Tahir in Yemen Times.
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Yemen is an impressive country. The most striking feature is undoubtedly its architecture. Houses seem to hang from rocks at the most unlikely places, blending in with the steep and spectacular landscape. Western architects typify Yemeni architecture as lacking a plan, but built by excellent craftsmen. Each house has been adapted to its surroundings, both as regards used materials as well as in form and dimensions. As a result, each Yemeni house is unique.
The architecture is very divers. Rock is used in the higher mountains. In Sanaa, the hundreds of five-storey houses (lower part rock, higher storeys baked bricks) fiercely compete in height. Each has a mafraj – a penthouse-like guest room with panoramic views and covered in mattresses and pillows – on top. The other rooms have smaller windows, crowned with a qamariyyah, an arch made of gypsum (or expensive alabaster) and coloured glass. Whitewashed gypsum – which has be renewed every other year – decorates the outer walls. Massive wooden doors, with elaborate carvings and decorated with metal, give entrance to low, cool stairways. In between the housing blocks there is room for trees and vegetable gardens.
Mud is used as a building material in the lower mountain areas and plains. In Saadah and its surroundings, groups of trapezium-type houses easily blend in with the colour of the earth, resulting in a unity of tone much like the mud architecture of Djenne, Mali. It is possible to walk across the clay wall surrounding Saadah. The houses it protects are soberly decorated with bands of white plaster. Masterpiece of Yemeni architecture is Shibam, once the capital of the Hadhramawt, and nicknamed Manhattan of the desert. Shibam boasts the world’s first skyscrapers, which are made out of mud bricks, and are up to seven storeys high. Shibam has been designated a world heritage site, with constant restorations under way to protect the city from ruin. In fact, many of the Yemeni architectural masterpieces are constantly being restored as mud and gypsum washes away with the rain and wind. As a result, the restorers are reinventing traditional architecture and training new generations in age-old skills. Funding is usually provided by foreign donors, as maintainment often proves too costly. Restoration of the famous Ashrafiyya Madrassa in Rada was completed in 2006, but many historic buildings throughout Yemen, including a large number of domes and whole citadels, are on the verge of collapse, awaiting repairs and restoration.
Yemeni men traditionally wear a thawb (also zannah, futah), a large cloth wrapped around their waist, held together with a broad, coloured belt and a dagger, and with a buttoned shirt and a jacket on top. You can tell which tribe a man belongs to and where he is from by the way the head cloth (or mshedda) is worn.
Most Yemeni women wear the niqab in public, some wear a burka. Urban women are clothed in black, rural women wear a more colourful dress and often only a hijab, or headscarf. Lately more and more urban girls and younger women are ceasing to cover their faces, wearing only a hijab instead.
All Yemenis speak Arabic, the northern part the Sanaa dialect, southerners the Taizzi or Adeni dialect. Up to half a million people in the eastern Hadhramawt – and the Hadhrami diaspora in East Asia – speak Hadhrami Arabic. Around sixty thousand people on the island of Socotra speak Socotran, which with its Indian, African and Portugese influences is more distinct from mainland Arabic. Most Yemenis do not speak any foreign languages. Mauritanian Arabic is similar to Yemeni Arabic. In fact, many believe that the North African Berbers are directly descended from the Yemenis. Many Saharan tribes claim descent from Bani Salim, who originate from Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The Berber nomadic tribe of the western Sahara, the Lamtuna, claims descent from the old South Arabian kingdom of Himyar. Islamic Sevilla – called Ishbiliyah – was governed by Yemeni Arabs descendant from the Banu Lakhm.
Yemeni music is little known outside the country. There are no famous Yemeni singers, as the musicians and songwriters have little means to record and market their music. However, Yemeni songs are reportedly often ‘stolen’ by artists from the Gulf, registering Yemeni songs under their own name.
Music is widely played and songs are sung continuously during work and long taxi drives. Small orchestras often perform at ceremonies and other feasts. Instruments used are the ud, a selection of small drums and the flute. The singers usually remain seated. Dancers enter the floor halfway through the songs. They dance by walking rhythmically, usually in pairs, splitting up and coming back together. Often they take out the jambiyya dagger, mimicking a fight or some other incident. After the first round of the dance, the audience is gestured to join in.
Yemeni popular culture has a rather rough edge to it, possibly as a reflection of the roughness of life, climate and terrain. However, the Yemeni language and speech can be very eloquent. Conversations are loaded with proverbs and can sometimes turn into verbal jousts. This possibly reflects Zamil, a form of traditional tribal poetry, with pre-Islamic roots, in which short poems are made up on the spot or recited from memory. Tribal disputes, modern social conflict – many problems have been solved through the chanting of Zamil.
Most poems are not committed to writing. Yemenis do not read much, but they do have well-trained memories. Age-old stories and tales are passed on orally to new generations. The same applies to songs and poems.
Qat can be called a drug, or a social custom. The truth lies somewhere between enjoying high tea and smoking cannabis collectively. It is a drug in the sense that it leads to a periodic state of alert eagerness, just short of exaltation. Qat is always chewed collectively, and usually with close friends. Intense social interactions and lively conversations, and the singing and reciting of poems are the result.
Qat is simply a bunch of twigs of a shrub called Catha Edulis. The young leaves of the twigs are chewed slowly and pushed into one cheek. The residue is slowly absorbed through the natural watering of the mouth. Chewing takes up to a few hours, after which the exalted social chewer retreats into meditation. Traditionally qat was used by the well-to-do and only on weekends, or at special events. The use of Qat has increased manyfold since it has become widely available.
Qat has therefore become the dominant factor in Yemen. Qat dominates the economy, taking up half the available working hours and in many cases half of household expenditure. Qat dominates daily life as the whole country comes to a standstill after midday prayers, and people seek the company of friends to sit and chew together. Qat consumes half the country’s water supply. Qat employs a large number of people and furnishes the rural population with cash, while taking up more and more arable land. In short: Yemen has become qat.
The increase of the use of qat has many negative effects, from individual health problems to the paralyzing of the Yemeni economy. There are voices calling to limit the use of qat, but this has not led to concrete policies, as public support is very low.
Yemeni restaurants are lively, busy places, with groups of men (women are seldom seen in restaurants) grabbing food from pots and plates placed in between them. Yemenis do not use cutlery, eating with the right hand is the norm. Food is often served on hot metal plates or in earthenware pots, heated by blazing flames, and is delivered boiling. Waiters preferably shout their orders somewhere in the direction of the kitchen. Eating takes no longer than ten minutes, after which everyone goes his way, which is usually to a qat session.
In the morning Yemenis eat a small plate of baked beans, or ful. At midday they eat a solid meal, as an important preparation for the qat session. Chicken, beef, and fish are part of the richer people’s diet, poorer people eat beans, more beans, kidney, eggs and bread. Vegetables are on most menus. Salta (see box) is a very popular Yemeni dish, notably in the North. In the evening Yemenis enjoy a small meal, the qat having taken away the feeling of hunger. Food stalls are found everywhere in the cities, offering a wide variety of seasonal food. Food in the rural areas is often limited to home-grown vegetables and cereals.
Salta is the most popular and probably the most authentic Yemeni dish. It originated in the north but is fastly becoming part of the menu in the south. The base of Salta is a dark stew, of which the ingredients vary regionally. Often it is made up of yesterday’s left-overs. A bitter, frothy green sauce, helba, is poured over the stew. Helba is made from fenugreek seeds, first beaten to powder and then left to froth with added water. The dish is served in a bowl hewn out of Saadah rock. These bowls are heat-proof – all dishes are presented literally boiling hot – and durable, even for Yemeni standards. Salta is considered the best preparation for a qat session.
Box: Recipe for Salta
First take a reasonable amount of (ground) fenugreek; dissolve it in water. Leave it for one hour. Then prepare meat or chicken soup. A special bowl called ‘Madr’ or ‘Makli’ is used to cook Salta. It is heat-proof. Place the empty bowl on the fire for five minutes. Then pour in some cooking oil, then some onions, to be followed by some fresh tomatoes. Mix everything well. Now add some pepper and one or two eggs. Then add some fresh potatoes. Mix well again; then add some soup as desired. Add some minced meat. The whole mixture is to be cooked for ten minutes. Remove the bowl from the fire. Remove some water from your fenugreek (called Hulbah) and pour it into the hot bowl. (Do not pour the fenugreek while the bowl is on the fire or else it will become bitter in taste.) The fenugreek will coagulate at the bottom of the bowl. Now mix in some citric acid. Keep on stirring until it is souped up. Add salt according to taste. Although it is the last course at lunch, it has to remain hot. People like it hot. (Yemen Times, September 2000)
Yemeni bread comes in various forms, always freshly baked and mostly as small pita-like breads or very light and small loafs. Noteworthy is mallouj, an immense, folded bread deliciously flavored with aniseed. Sweet doughry is not as common in Yemen as elsewhere in the Arab world. An exception is Bint al Sahn, a delicious desertcake made of thin layers of dough drenched in superior Yemeni honey, and covered with ghee.
Drinks are mostly limited to tea. Shahai ahmar (red tea) is strong, sweet black tea, flavoured with cloves or mint. Shahai halib is tea with sweetened condensed milk. Fruit juices are widely available in the cities. Coffee is drunk only occasionally, and is often flavoured with cardamon. Yemenis more often drink qishr, a light drink made from coffee husks and cardamom.
Yemen is not a very sportive nation. Soccer is played by Yemeni kids, in the alleys and streets of Yemen. There are hardly any sporting grounds or gymnasiums. In 2005, Yemen’s national football team was suspended by the fifa for alleged corruption within the National Football Union.
Yemen does compete in the Asian, Arab and Olympic Games. In the 2006 Asian Games a Yemeni Wushu player won a bronze medal. The Yemeni gymnast Nashwan al-Harazi won several medals in Arab and Asian Games, including the first ever golden medal won by a Yemeni, at the Arab Games in november 2007.
Banner: “She is from Aden. In Aden the people are more tolerant. I’ve heard they want to start training girls here in Sanaa next year. If I were to have a daughter, I would surely like to see her do gymnastics. Only, not here in Sanaa. People would say bad things about her.” Olympic gymnast Nashwan al-Harazi, on a female Yemeni athlete runner, also competing in the 2008 Olympics.
In 2005, the British-Yemeni director Bader Ben Hersi won the award for the best Arabic film at the Cairo Film festival with the movie A New Day in Old Sanaa, which was also the first Yemeni film shown at the Cannes Film Festival. Previously (2000) Bader Ben Hersi shot the documentary The English Sheikh and the Yemeni Gentleman, together with the author Tim Mackintosh-Smith.
Another filmproducer is Kahdija al-Salami, a Yemeni born woman living in France. Al-Salami has produced numerous documentaries and films, often focusing on the subordinant role of women in Yemeni society. Al-Salami herself suffered from abuse and rape when she was married off to an uncle as an eleven-year-old girl. However, Al-Salami managed to escape both the marriage and Yemeni society. At the age of sixteen she travelled to the US to study communication. Later she came to live, study and work in France.
There is a small stock of books on travels by foreigners toYemen. The famous Moroccan explorer Ibn Battuta visited Yemen briefly in the early fourteenth century. The oldest Western report on Yemen is by two Spanish Jesuit priests, passing through Yemen in 1590 on their way from Goa to Ethiopia. More vivid is a book by Carsten Niebuhr (Travels in Arabia), a member of a group of scientists exploring the mysterious Arabia Felix in the eigtheenth century for the Danish king. Niebuhr was the sole surviver.
Early twentieth century a small wave of English travellers visited the eastern parts of Yemen which were under British rule. Freya Stark (The Gates of Arabia) explored the Hadhramawt extensively, Wilfred Thesiger (Arabian Sands) visited the empty quarter and the fringes of eastern Yemen. Other explorers include Hugh Scott, Harold Ingrams and the Dutch diplomat Van der Meulen. More recent are the books written by Tim Mackintosh-Smith (Travels in a Dictionary Land) and Kevin Rushby (Eating the Flowers of Paradise).
Banner: “I had already for some time practiced to live by good Arabic customs and therefore did not need knife, fork or spoon. He who can adapt to this way of travelling, and who is content to find nothing but stale bread in the local inn, he will surely experience as many pleasures as I myself have experienced.” (Carsten Niebuhr in Travels in Arabia)
Eleven Things to Do, Taste, Chew and See in Yemen
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Urban Economy
Until the revolution of 1962, Yemen’s economy was closed. After the revolution, Yemen became an open ‘no doors’ economy, with little or no restrictions. In the 1970s and 1980s, at least one male family member was working in Saudi Arabia, sending home large amounts of money that fed the consumption. Yemen has had a consumer economy ever since, feeding a large informal economy. Estimates put this figure at between 60% and 80% of the total economy. Street vendors are everywhere, much of the trade goes unrecorded and the same applies to the large service sector. The building sector is booming in towns such as Sana’a and Taizz, with labourers armed with spades and tools waiting to be picked up at the main crossroads.
Yemenis are born traders. The streets of Yemen are lined with small shops offering the same stock, with little specialization. Open air markets are common, with vendors selling just the one product, or small-scale artisan products occupying many of the pavements. Industrial production is virtually non-existent, apart from a biscuit factory in Taizz. Nearly everything in Yemen is imported. The only positive exception is the urban building sector, which is booming as urbanization speeds up.
Average income stands at an annual 760$ per capita, which is well into the lower range of low-income countries. By comparison, the average income in Oman en Saudi Arabia is $9000 and $12.500, in Egypt $1350. Yemen is certainly the poorest country in the Middle East, leaving only eight African countries behind when indexed on income per capita. Close to 40% of the population has an income below the international poverty line of $2 a day (World Development Report (wdr), 2007). There is widespread unemployment (35%, estimate of various sources). Of the young population (15-24), only 26% is employed, while the figure for child labour stands at 14% (wdr, 2007).
Banner: Economists and analysts say corruption is a large obstacle to Yemen’s development and responsible for deterring 50 percent of development projects. Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index for 2006 placed Yemen at 111 out of 163 countries. (Yemen Times, May, 2007)Agriculture
Yemen is still very much a rural country, with over 70% (figure 2007) of the population living a self-sufficient, agricultural life in small mountain villages. More than half the population (52%, 2006) still tills the earth to feed themselves. The little overproduction is brought to the local market. Surplus agricultural value has risen to $511, but is still very low in comparison to $1100 in Oman, $14.000 in Saudi Arabia, or $39.000 in the Netherlands. The agricultural sector contributes 21% to gross domestic product (gdp). Most of this, however, is as a result of qat production.
Food security is low. More and more land being designated for qat cultivation, food sufficiency has decreased to a third of total demand. Moreover, in the 1980s, Yemen’s economy shifted to consumption fed by remittances of expatriates in Saudi Arabia. Many of the ancient, labour intensive terraces that adorn the mountains were subsequently neglected, giving way to erosion. Agriculture on a somewhat larger scale is practised only in the flat Tihama and in the vicinity of Marib. The rebuilding of the dam in Marib has not yet led to a significant rise in food production, a structure of canals yet to be completed.
Coffee
Legend has it that coffee was first discovered in Ethiopia, but the global advance of coffee certainly started from Yemen. Yemeni traders marketed Yemeni grown coffee from the tenth century onwards throughout the Middle East. Coffee became very popular after it was introduced in Istanbul in the sixteenth century and from there on towards the West.
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company made an unsuccessful bid to monopolize the trade through control of Yemen’s southern port of Al Mokha. Instead, they took seedlings to the Dutch East Indies, from where the large increase in global coffee production spread. Yemen’s mountains still produce coffee of exceptional quality (Harazi, Bani Mattar, Ismaili), but Yemen produces only about 200.000 60 kilogram bags of green coffee, compared to one million bags in Kenia and over four million in Ethiopia.
Box. Al Mokha. One of Yemen’s prime trading houses, Al Kabus – very famous for its tea –, is trying to (re)gain the exclusive right to use the name Mokha for indigenous Yemeni coffee, just as Parmaham, Camembert or Champagne are protected names for regional produce. Al Mokha is the name of the Yemeni port where the international coffee trade originated. Mokha is also the name of a coffee with a chocolaty flavour. Efforts are under way to reserve the geographical name of Al Mokha or Mocca for Yemeni coffee.
Qat
Qat increasingly dominates daily life in Yemen. It subsequently increasingly dominates all aspects of the economy. More and more agricultural land is planted with qat shrubs, supplanting foodstuffs such as sorghum, maize, tomatoes or potatoes. Qat now takes up 11% of agricultural land, twenty times as much as in 1970. Qat shrubs consume large amounts of water. They were therefore traditionally confined to the rain-fed mountain terraces on the wetter (west)side of the mountains. As more and more diesel pumps have been installed and ground and fossil water have become widely available, qat is now cultivated throughout Yemen.
The reason for the abundance of qat shrubs is that qat is a cash crop. It yields much more profit than other crops. Qat production gives (rural) households the opportunity to gain income. Qat production employs half a million people. In 2005, qat production reached 124 thousand tons, up from 8 thousand in 1970. On the negative side, on average qat consumption makes up a quarter of household expenditure. For poor people this percentage is a lot higher. It often supplants food exependiture or other basic needs. Ironically, chewing qat takes away the feeling of hunger as well. According to Yemen’s last five-year plan, 20 million working hours are wasted every day due to qat consumption.
Methods of qat cultivation have improved and better varieties have become available through selection. As a result, qat can now be harvested up to six times a year, compared to twice a year previously. This intensive cultivation consumes large amounts of costly water, and the owners of the pumps are taking increasing shares of the profit. It is estimated that qat production uses up to 80% of all irrigation water, and 40% of all the water used in Yemen. As rainfall does not refill groundwater resevoirs at the same pace as it is pumped up, water is rapidly becoming scarce. Many reservoirs have already dried up, making it necessary to drill deeper and deeper, or to search for new, fossil water fields. The government tries to limit the amount of pumps and their depth, but corruption, tribalism and nepotism often stand in the way. The groundwater reservoir underneath Sa’adah has already dried up, the Sana’a reservoir will have dried up within ten to fifteen years. This has prompted the government to come up with a plan for relocation of nearly the entire population of Sana’a to a new city on the Red Sea coast. In Taizz and elsewhere the search for new fields continues.
Furthermore, where traditional qat production did not use fertilizers and pesticides, the intensive cultivation of today requires a lot of chemicals. The result is degradation and contamination of the soil. Worse still, because the chemicals contaminate the actual plants, qat consumption presently involves much higher levels of contamination. As a result, tongue and mouthcancer are becoming a major disease in Yemen. The levels of contamination – because of wrong usage, or usage of old or elsewhere banned chemicals – are sometimes so high that sudden death of qat consumers occurs.
Banner: “I can do nothing but grow qat. Qat is the only crop that returns investment, plus some profit. These used to be potato fields. I’d rather plant potatoes again, but that will only cost me money.” (Qatfarmer in Wadi Hama, Taizz)
Fish
There is an abundance of marine wealth along Yemen’s long coasts and around its islands. The Arabian sea is considered by marine biologists to be a highly productive fishing ground, the Red Sea is considered moderately productive. The Yemeni fishing industry is not very sophisticated or organized as yet, three-quarters of the fish production being caught by small boats and sold locally or regionally. The governorate of Al Maharah – far east, bordering Oman – catches 40% of the total of an estimated 250 thousand tons of fish. The governorates of Hadhramawt (30%) and Hodeidah (Red Sea, 10%) come in second and third. It is believed an annual maximum catch of 400.000 tons is sustainable for Yemeni fishing waters.
According to Yemen, fishing accounts for a modest (1%) share of gdp, but the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (fao) puts this number at 15%, probably because it includes locally sold production. There are around 70.000 fishermen in Yemen, while the total workforce dependent on fish production is estimated at well above 200.000. The revenue of fishing exports accounts for 13% of all non-oil exports. Yemen regards the fishing industry as a very promising sector. The growth of fish production was significant (15%) during 2000-2005, but has apparently shrunk to below the annual target of 7%.
Oil and Gas
Unlike its neighbouring lands, Yemen’s soil is not blessed with formidable oil fields. Oil was found in the eastern governorates during the 1980s and 1990s. Although production has always been franchised to foreign oil companies, it has given the government an unprecedented autonomous income. This has resulted in a much stronger state, capable of rolling out basic social and medical institutions and of challenging tribal autonomy.
Crude oil production started in 1984 with eight million barrels a day, and has since increased to over 400 million barrels. As a comparison, Saudi Arabia produces twenty times as much, Oman produces double the amount. In 2005, oil revenues accounted for 12,5% of the gdp, for 67% of government income, and for 86% of export revenues.
Exploration and production are largely in the hands of foreign companies, in franchise with the Yemeni Oil Ministry. American Hunt and Total have a big presence in Yemen. They have been subject to tribal attacks – tribes wanting a bigger share of the profit – at the production sites, and even in the capital, Sana’a. Most of the produced oil is sold as crude oil, some is refined in Aden. More refineries are currently being built in both Hodaydah and at the end of the pipeline running from the oil fields to the Red Sea.
As projected by the World Bank, Yemen will run out of oil in 2012. However, exploration of new fields is under way, not only in the eastern desert, but also in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea. Yemen’s present oil minister is confident production levels will be at an unprecedented target of 500 million barrels a day in the ‘near future’. A large natural gas field was found by Yemen and Total in the eastern lowlands. Production is due to start in 2009, in anticipation of foreign specialists and the building of a new pipeline.
Tourism
Tourism has big economic potential, but at present remains on a small scale. The poor tourist infrastructure – there are simply not enough adequate hotel beds and restaurant chairs for tourists – does not really facilitate growth. In 2005, tourist arrivals topped 300.000, half of them from Arab countries, up from 100.000 in the previous decades. Tourist expenditure in that same year amounted to 2,4% of gdp, or 33% of total export value, and gave jobs to some 34.000 people. As a comparison, Yemen’s neighbour Oman – which has much less antiquities – receives up to a million tourists a year, while a country like Egypt welcomes over a million tourists a month.
Besides a poor tourist infrastructure, Yemen’s image in world news also did not help stimulate the arrival of tourists. The kidnappings of the 1990s did not really affect the number of tourists coming to Yemen. The killings of tourists in 1998, and again in 2007 and 2008 by al-Qaeda affiliates, were far more harmful, however. A significant part of Yemen – the warring north and the tribal east – is unsafe and off limits for tourists. Foreign governments frequently issue travel warnings to potential visitors.
The economic potential of tourism is enormous. The unrivalled Yemeni architecture coupled with well restored ancient cities could make Yemen a prime tourist destination. There is a wealth of archaeological monuments, and there’s twice as much yet to be discovered or restored. The scenic mountains offer ample opportunities for active holidaymakers all year round. The Red Sea coast is a paradise for deep-sea diving and ‘beach tourism’.
Box: Yemen’s foremost tourist company Universal entertains a large number of investment plans for the whole of Yemen. But care must be taken, says director Jamal Omar, as the Yemenis have only just escaped long time isolation. “Cultural differences between the Yemeni population and the potential tourist are still very large. It’s better to let Yemen adjust slowly to tourism.” Consequently, Omar sees no future in Red Sea resorts such as in Egypt. “Let us concentrate on the educated, middle aged, culturally interested tourists. Let us concentrate on eco-tourism.”
Remittances, Aid, Investment and Debt
In the 1970s and 1980s, near to a million Yemeni migrants were working in Saudi Arabia, contributing financially to the booming consumer economy. Most of them were expelled as a result of Yemen’s neutral stand in the 1991 Gulf War. However, many have since returned to work in Saudi Arabia. The total share of remittances in the gdp stood at 16% in 2000, and at 7% in 2007.
For years foreign aid has been an important contributor to the national economy and social services, but has dwindled to $12 per capita, or around 3% of the gdp. The Yemeni debt service currently stands at a third of the national income.
The present Yemeni government is working hard to induce foreign investors to invest in Yemen. Donor conferences in The Hague in 1995 and in London 2006 yielded large amounts of promised money. Meanwhile, foreign investors and the World Bank are pushing the government to promote transparent and good governance, to eradicate corruption and nepotism, and to improve the unsafe infrastructure. At present, investors seem very reluctant to invest in Yemen, total foreign investment coming to just $144 million in 2006.
Banner: Five years ago, three families put all their money together, drilled a well and invested in a pump. They now sell their water to the farmers in the neighbourhood and are earning a thousand riyals ($5) per hour, 24/7. The investment of $15.000 has long been returned. As long as the water flows it equals liquid gold.
Banner: Until the 1980s the government encouraged everybody to drill wells and invest in pumps, as fuel was cheap and water supplies seemed inexhaustible. Today, the government is at pains to limit the pumps, and convince (tribal) owners to stop the illegal pumping. In ten years Sana’a’s water resources will have dried up.
Banner: The United Arab Emirates (uae) play a primary role in supporting Yemen and qualifying its economy to become fully integrated into the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) block. The Yemeni community in the Emirates is very large, with most Yemenis operating businesses there. (Yemen Times, 2006)
Banner: Instead of halving the proportion of those without access to safe drinking water by 2015, Yemen faces the risk that water soon may be unavailable in all critical water basins. Therefore, strong national leadership is needed to reverse the current unsustainable use of water in Yemen. (Statement by international donor conference, London)
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Newspapers
In Yemeni cities newspaper kiosks attract small crowds of people around their stalls. On the surface it would appear that newspapers are widely read in Yemen, but this is beside the truth. Many adult Yemenis are still illiterate; three quarters of the population lives a rural life, far away from the newspaper stalls. As a result, only a small section of the Yemeni people has access to newspapers. A selection of government newspapers provide daily editions. Most papers are published weekly, twice weekly or biweekly. Pro-government papers (Al Thawra, Al Jumhuriyya, 14-October, Al Sharara) can have a circulation of up to 50.000 copies, and are distributed throughout the country, including all government offices.
Other papers are limited to a few thousand copies, and are only distributed in the larger cities. Two English language papers are published in Yemen, Yemen Times and Yemen Observer. The Yemen Times is considered one of the most objective, independent newspapers. Most Yemenis cannot read it as it is in English. The censor therefore seems to grant the newspaper greater freedom of speech and room to manoeuvre. The current editor, Nadia Al Saqqaf, daughter of the paper’s founder Al Abdulaziz Al Saqqaf, is the first and sole female Yemeni editor to date. In 2006, Nadia Al Saqqaf received the Gebran Tueni award from the World Association of Newspapers (wan) for her outstanding courage, ambition, leadership and professionalism.
The Yemeni newspaper landscape is quite diverse and dynamic. According to government statistics, in 2005 there were 57 newspapers and 66 periodicals. More then performing the traditional role of informing a large public, Yemeni newspapers are very much a debating ground. Opinions and opinionated articles fill a significant portion of the pages and many newspapers are strongly coloured by their tribal or political background, or by financiers seeking election or other short-term goals. As a consequence, there is or has been quite a number of small and sometimes short-lived newspapers with limited distribution. Nowadays, most Yemeni newspapers also publish on the Internet, thus contributing to the growth of information available to Yemenis in and outside of Yemen.
Yemeni journalists are well organized and have in the last decade showed remarkable supra-factional solidarity in the face of government restrictions, together concentrating on reports on the widespread corruption. In 2007, Parliament debated a new press and media law, but according to various journalists, national and international professional organisations, press freedom and freedom of expression have since only deteriorated. In the face of a deteriorating economy, the guerrilla war in the north and the widespread discontent in the south, opposition newspapers are regularly and increasingly being shut down by the government or otherwise thwarted. Many journalists are increasingly hindered in their work – or even jailed.
In 2007, the Yemen Observer was temporarily closed down after publishing the Danish cartoons illustrating an article condemning the cartoons. Many journalists walk the thin line between self- censorship and the risk of being officially or unofficially hindered or having their newspaper shut down. There are no reports of journalists being killed, but the list of persecuted, imprisoned or harassed journalists is growing. As a consequence, Reporters Without Borders has placed Yemen a mere 143th on a list of 169 countries.
On the positive side, in May 2008, a Sana’a judge ordered the Ministry of Information to reissue newspaper Al Wasat’s newspaper license. In April 2008, Al Wasat lost its official license for the first time because it had purportedly ‘violated national unity’. Al Wasat has been a target – being closed down now and then – of the various Saleh-governments throughout the years. In 2005, it’s editor Jamal Amer was beaten up and harassed by unknown men. In 2006, Amer was awarded the Press Freedom Award by the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (cpj). Another award-winning journalist is Nadia al-Saqqaf, editor-in-chief of the Yemen Times, who received the Gebran Tueni Award from the World Association of Newspapers in 2006.
Box: The most poignant example of persecution and harassment of journalists is that of Abdel Karim Al Khaiwani. The only Yemeni journalist not to censor himself, Al Khaiwani addresses all subjects and repeatedly pays for it physically, psychologically and financially. Al Khaiwani was journalist and editor of the Zaydi opposition newspaper Al Shoura, later published on a website under the same name. Al Shoura is the prime source of information on the guerrilla war in the north, on which information is hard to get, because journalists are not permitted to enter or report on the north. Al Khaiwani does report on it and on other topics which are off-limits, and has consequently and repeatedly been beaten up and threatened with his (and his family’s) life. In 2008 Al Khaiwani an official death sentence was demanded by the prosecutor, the judge sentenced him to six years in prison.
Television
Television has long been dominated by the two state television channels, based in Aden (TV1) and Sana’a (TV2). Its reports are typical of Arab state television, reporting on the whereabouts and the beneficial deeds of the president and his guests. However, since the oil boom, emigration to Saudi Arabia and the launch of satellite television, many houses have had reason and means to invest in satellite dishes. These offer the Yemeni – half the population is still illiterate – a new window on the world. Most popular are the programs of independent channels Al Jazeera, Al Arabiyya and the Hezbollah channel of Al Manar.
In the first months of 2008, two new Yemeni satellite TV channels (Saba, Al Yemenia) were launched, with a third (Al Eman, from the religious Al Eman-university of Islah forman Al Zindani) to be launched in the near future.
Box: Given that Yemen is not of the utmost importance in world politics, reporters from the international satellite channels rarely visit Yemen. However, local correspondents of Al Arabiyya and Al Jazeera have repeatedly been held and interrogated by the police. Many reporters from foreign (satellite) channels were prevented from covering the social unrest – in reaction to economic problems, rising unemployment and the general alienation of the South – in southern Yemen in the autumn of 2007. Al Arabiyya reported that video footage of their stringers has been confiscated fourteen times since 2003.
Internet
Since 2005, the number of Internet cafés and home Internet connections in the larger cities has exploded. Many of the young generation – over half of the total population – now gather information that was previously inaccessible, because of censorship, lack of finance and poor communication possibilities. As a result, the iron grip of government and conservatism on Yemeni society seems to be loosening, although the rural majority is largely unaffected by this development.
As is often the case in other Middle Eastern countries, the government has started to block sites and weblogs considered detrimental to national unity. This has been the case with yemenportal.net, an initiative of Walid Al Saqqaf, one of Yemen’s leading journalists, former editor of the English language Yemen Times and member of a family of journalists. His father – the first editor and founder of the Yemen Times Abdulaziz Al Saqqaf – was shortly imprisoned in 1994 and killed in a car accident in 1999, which some believe was not accidental.
Yemenportal is a news platform and web crawler, presenting the fast growing Yemeni online community with an unprecedented comprehensive view of Yemeni news. Yemenportal also publishes banned news reports, which prompted the government to block the site three times early 2008, while assailants physically attacked the office of Yemenportal. The site now runs from Sweden, Yemeni visitors using special software and proxy sites to circumvent the blockade. It serves not only as a independent source of information, but also as a meeting point for the opposition.
Banner: Walid Al Saqqaf, of the news engine Yemenportal, said that Internet now plays an important role in Yemeni society, even if less than one percent of Yemenis has access to it. “In a country like Yemen, culture plays a crucial role in disseminating information. If one person reads an article on the Internet, he will spread this message to literally hundreds of people. Word of mouth is extremely powerful in our society.” (From mennassat.com)
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